1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3	THE HONORABLE JAMES C. MAHAN, JUDGE PRESIDING
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5	
6	MARK B. KABINS,
7	Plaintiff,
8	vs. NO. 2:11-CV-1742-JCM-RJJ
9	KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, MOTION HEARING
10	Defendant.
11	
12	
13	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
14	TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012
15	10:00 A.M.
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17	
18	APPEARANCES:
19	For the Plaintiff: DAVID CHESNOFF, ESQ.
20	RICHARD SCHONFELD, ESQ. SARALIENE DURRETT, ESQ.
21	For the Defendant: ROGER WENTHE, ESQ.
22	JILL WRIGHT, ESQ.
23	
24	
25	Reported by: Joy Garner, CCR 275 Official Federal Court Reporter
	JOY GARNER, CCR 275

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      LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012
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                        10:00 A.M.
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                  PROCEEDINGS
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6
              THE CLERK: Mark Kabins versus Kathleen
7
    Sebelius, 2:11-CV-1742-JCM-RJJ. This is the time
8
    set for a motion hearing.
9
                     Counsel, please note your
10
    appearances.
              THE COURT: Mr. Chesnoff.
11
12
              MR. CHESNOFF: Good morning, your
13
    Honor, David Chesnoff appearing with my client,
14
    Dr. Kabins, along with Richard Schonfeld and
15
    Saraliene Durrett of my office.
16
              THE COURT: All right, thank you.
17
              MR. WENTHE: Your Honor, Roger Wenthe
18
    on behalf of the United States, and with me is
19
    Jill Wright who is an attorney with the
20
    Department of Health and Human Services Office
21
    and counsel for the Inspector General.
22
              THE COURT: All right, thank you.
23
                     All right, I've reviewed this
24
    with my brain trust. Let me tell you what I'm
25
    inclined to do and then I'll give everyone a
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1
    chance to argue as you see fit. We've all heard
2
    the saying, hard cases make bad law, and this is
3
    a hard case. At various times over the last
4
    twenty-four hours, I've been I'm going to rule
5
    this way, and then I'll look at the case, look at
6
    this again, the facts here, I'm going to rule the
7
    other way. So I've gone back and forth on this
8
    with my brain trust. This is an interesting
9
    case, but it's certainly not clear-cut in my
10
    mind.
11
                     You pronounce your last name
12
    Kay-bins (phonetic), right, Doctor?
13
              THE PLAINTIFF: Correct.
14
              THE COURT: I didn't want to
15
    mispronounce your name. There's nothing more
16
    irritating than have somebody mispronounce your
17
    name continually. First of all, Dr. Kabins had
18
    been convicted of a crime, you know, and so let's
19
    put that on the table and that's a terrible thing
20
    and you can say whatever you want to about that,
21
    but put that on the shelf. That's just a given.
22
    He's been excluded here by the Secretary Sebelius
23
    under the exclusion statute.
24
                      It seems to me the purpose of
25
    the exclusion statute is to protect the
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1
    government from people who have cheated the
2
    government program, and you see if you look at
3
    the -- I've had the brain trust look at some of
4
    the people who have been excluded, and if
5
    somebody committed an actual fraud or
6
    embezzlement or some sort of thing like that,
7
    cheating a government program, it's a --
8
                      And let me have a fictional Dr.
9
    Mahan who sets up his practice and, you know,
10
    rips off Medicare and embezzles or overcharges,
11
    or whatever, and so he pleads guilty to some
12
    crime and serves a couple of years in jail, and
13
    then he's out again. And so Dr. Mahan's uncle is
14
    the Chairman of the State Medical Board, or
15
    whatever, so he gets re-licensed and he says,
16
    okay, Secretary Sebelius, you have to deal with
17
    me again.
18
                      Do we really? Do we really have
19
    to? It's almost like fool me once, shame on you;
20
    fool me twice, shame on me. The government still
21
    has to deal with this guy? And that's what the
22
    statute I think is designed to prevent that if
23
    somebody -- you're just an embezzler, or cheater,
24
    or whatever, and the government can exclude, but
25
    that's the way the statute is.
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1
                     Let me give you another example
2
    again with Dr. Mahan. He sells his house, and he
3
    sells the house and commits a fraud in selling
4
    the house, misrepresents something. Can he be
5
    excluded under the statute? No, because the
6
    statute is drawn so that it's got to be in
7
    connection with health care services. I'll get
8
    into that in just a minute more, but so Dr. Mahan
9
    commits a fraud selling his house. That doesn't
10
    give the grounds to the Secretary to exclude him.
11
                     Now, here Dr. Kabins was
12
    convicted of misprision and failure to report a
13
    felony. If you look at the -- the -- well, first
14
    of all, look at the statute, the exclusion
15
    statute and the regulations that the Secretary
    has promulgated, the statute didn't say is a
16
17
    little bit unwieldy which is so unusual to think
18
    that the congress people would draft an unwieldy
19
    statute, but if you look at the regulations, I
20
    think they pretty clearly follow the statute.
21
                     We've got four requirements and
22
    so everybody understands I'm speaking now from 42
23
    CFR, Section 1001.101(c). Four requirements:
24
    The individual must have been convicted of a
25
    felony, and that's true of Dr. Kabins here; the
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felonious conduct must have occurred after August
1
2
    21, 1996, that's true here. So we're really
3
    focusing on the third and fourth elements. The
4
    felony offense must have been related to fraud,
5
    theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary
6
    responsibility, or other financial misconduct,
7
    and the felony offense -- number four, the felony
8
    offense must have been in connection with the
9
    delivery of a health care item or service.
10
                      And if you look at what happened
11
    here, at Dr. Kabins's conduct here, the
12
    misprision was committed in connection with legal
13
    services, not medical services. This occurred
14
    well after the medical services were rendered and
15
    all indications are that there's no complaint
16
    about the medical services. And I say that
17
    somewhat advisedly because after the fact, you
18
    know, people's memories is better -- and I
19
    shouldn't say is better -- may have been altered
20
    by subsequent events.
21
                      For example, if Dr. Kabins, and
22
    I don't know this, but if he settled on the side
23
    with Ms. Simon, and I don't know whether that
24
    happened or not, but suddenly she says, oh, that
25
    terrible Dr. Kabins. And then, oh, yes, he was
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wonderful and, yes, all his services were
1
2
    wonderful and blah, blah, blah.
3
                      I mean so put that aside.
4
    mean I understand the credibility of witnesses is
5
    questionable in something like this, but it
    appears that the medical services were fine.
6
7
    There's no question about the quality of the
8
    medical services. So the misprision occurred
9
    with legal services, not medical services.
10
                     Now, the -- you can go with the
11
    regulations rather than the statute, but it just
12
    is clearer. The felony offense must have been
13
    related to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of
    fiduciary responsibility, or financial
14
15
                 This was, like I say, it was legal
    misconduct.
16
    services. I don't know that -- however you want
17
    to characterize it, fraud, and certainly fraud, I
18
    don't know, maybe. No theft, embezzlement,
19
    breach of fiduciary responsibility, it may be, or
20
    other financial misconduct. So number three is a
21
    maybe.
22
                     Number four, the felony offense
23
    must have been in connection with the delivery of
24
    a health care item or service, and here it's just
25
    not. I mean there's a medical service underlying
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everything, of course, because he's a doctor and that's what we're dealing with, but I just don't see that the exclusion statute applies here. I'm concerned a little bit, too, about selective prosecution.
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If we had a case where every doctor who's convicted of a felony is subject to exclusion, then, you know, here we go. I'm sorry, Doctor, but that's the way it works, or whatever, you deal with that and you have different arguments I'm sure, but I'm concerned, too, about selective prosecution that a bureaucrat somewhere decides here's what we're going to do, we're going to do this, we're going to do that. We're going to prosecute this doctor, not that doctor, and that's always troubling to the Court if there's no uniformity with the decision to prosecute.

Let's see, that's the memo in support of your motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff, and then at page 20 you list some doctors that plead guilty to -- here's one the misprision, the various felonies, and they were not -- they were not excluded. And what's the rational basis for excluding Dr. Kabins? I just

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don't see it anywhere. So honestly this is a
1
2
    close question in my mind. I've gone back and
    forth on it, but I just -- I come back to I think
3
4
    it's the misprision was in connection with
5
    rendering of legal services or providing legal
6
    services and not the medical services.
7
                      There was no question -- I
8
    haven't seen any question at all about the
9
    medical services. They apparently were
10
    appropriate and certainly Ms. Simon is not
11
    complaining about that, although that doesn't
    carry the day. As I've said, you know, it's a
12
13
    matter of credibility and we can say, well, I
14
    don't believe her, but I had the brain trust
15
    quickly try to identify doctors who had been
16
    excluded and they had been doctors who, like I
17
    said at the very beginning, like our fictional
18
    Dr. Mahan who committed overcharging or
19
    embezzlement or theft of some sort from the
20
    Medicare program, but it seems to me that Dr.
21
    Kabins's conduct here, his conviction here, was
22
    not related to fraud or other misconduct in
23
    connection with revision of a medical service.
24
    So what I'm inclined to do is to grant summary
25
    judgment to the plaintiff.
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Now, I'll give you -- do you
want to talk me out of that, Mr. Chesnoff?
          MR. CHESNOFF: I was just going to say,
your Honor, I don't want to talk -- we worked
very hard, my colleagues, on the pleadings and
obviously you've studied them along with your
staff, so I don't want to talk myself out.
think the only thing that I would add is this,
your Honor. I think that one of the things that
really pushes it to our direction is that this
court through Judge Quackenbush, who I consider
one of the finest jurists I've ever appeared in
front of in all my years, has specifically said
on several occasions pointedly that what Dr.
Kabins was convicted of had nothing to do with a
health care violation, and he was the finder of
fact as to the plea and as to the companion
cases.
                 And why that's so important,
your Honor, is he went out of his way to say that
he wanted Dr. Kabins to continue to provide
medical services to the people of the state of
Nevada and to allow an uncontrolled federal
bureaucrat to basically disregard the clear
statutory elemental requirements and you, as a
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sitting federal judge, and me who practices an
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2
    area of the law where the elements are crucial,
3
    then unless those elements are met, your decision
4
    is righteous and clear and it is completely
5
    consistent with what Dr. Kabins pled to.
6
                      And as you said, the legislative
7
    intent here was not to punish a doctor who
8
    committed an -- did an operation well before the
9
    honest service fraud occurred and involved legal,
10
    not medical and, therefore, this kind of knee
11
    jerk reaction that Dr. Kabins received and
12
    basically kicking sand in the face of Judge
13
    Quackenbush who pointedly, pointedly, wanted Dr.
14
    Kabins to do what he does which is to serve
15
    people.
16
                      The effect of what the Secretary
    did here doesn't just mean that Dr. Kabins
17
18
    doesn't get paid from Medicare and Medicaid.
                                                    Ιt
19
    has a real affect on his entire practice,
20
    including his right to practice in certain
21
    hospitals. So the Court would be following the
22
    direction of two branches of government, the
23
    legislative in enacting the law, and your brother
24
    judge in his interpretation of what this
25
    conviction meant.
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So with that said, your Honor, I
    don't believe under any standard proffered by the
    Secretary they meet the elemental requirement to
    have banned him, and I ask that you put your
    imprimatur on what you've indicated is your
    intention, your Honor.
              THE COURT: All right.
              MR. CHESNOFF:
                             Thank vou.
              THE COURT: And I'll just say if Judge
    Quackenbush had found to the contrary, he didn't
    look at this as closely as I did. I mean I'm
    glad that we agree with each other, but I looked
    at it independently and closely.
                     Mr. Wenthe, I'll be glad to hear
15
    anything you have to say, sir.
              MR. WENTHE: Thank you, your Honor.
              THE COURT: Yes, sir.
              MR. WENTHE: I think that what's
    necessary here is to return to the first
    principle of why this statute exists. Congress
21
    enacted this exclusion statute because Congress
    can decide who the federal government will do
23
    business with and who it will not do business
    with, and this provision that we're dealing with
25
    today was added in 1996 because the existing
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1
    provisions were considered not broad enough to
2
    cover the types of people who the government does
3
    not want to do business with.
4
                      Before 1996, it already had a
5
    provision separate from this one that says
6
    anybody who defrauds the Medicare program or
7
    overcharges the Medicare program will be
8
    excluded, must be excluded. This provision was
9
    added because that wasn't broad enough so that
10
    what you maybe have had your brain trust look at
11
    is cases under that previously existing, and
12
    still existing, provision.
13
                      This provision was added so that
14
    anyone who commits any kind of -- and not just
15
    fraud -- but, as you said --
16
              THE COURT: -- theft, or embezzlement,
17
    or other financial misconduct, or breach of
18
    fiduciary duty.
19
              MR. WENTHE: There we go -- and breach
2.0
    of fiduciary duty.
21
              THE COURT: Yeah.
22
              MR. WENTHE:
                            That's a very broad range
23
    of things, and we have to ask ourselves how can
24
    those things occur in connection with the
25
    delivery of a health care item or service because
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that's the other thing you have to have. And I
1
2
    think if you're going to read this statute to say
3
    the health care item or service has to come after
4
    the fraud, or embezzlement, or theft, or
5
    whatever, which is what I think you're saying.
6
              THE COURT: But, no, no, no, it's got
7
    to come in connection with that. The way I read
8
    the statute, Mr. Wenthe, is the fraud, or theft,
9
    or embezzlement has to come in connection with
10
    the provision of a medical service.
11
              MR. WENTHE: In connection with --
12
              THE COURT: Here it occurred well after
13
    the provision of the medical service.
14
              MR. WENTHE: And Congress was
15
    deliberately broad by using the words "in
16
    connection with." What you were saying is that
17
    you're --
18
              THE COURT: And I agree. I mean that's
19
    very broad language and we look at the statute
20
    "in connection with" as very broad, but it's got
21
    to be in connection with the provision of the
22
    medical service. This occurred -- here it
23
    occurred well after, did it not, well after the
24
    medical service was provided?
25
              MR. WENTHE: But, see, when you're
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saying well after, then you're saying in connection with only means before the medical service is provided.
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THE COURT: No, no, to me it means contemporaneously generally, and I can't say -- I mean it's possible that it would arise -- some fraud would arise later. I mean, for example, with billing. For example, let's say that -- we'll go back to Dr. Mahan. Dr. Mahan performs a service and then he doesn't bill for it for three months, but there's some -- some -- he overcharges, he triple bills or something three months later, is that -- but it's in connection with the provision of the medical service. So I mean the temporal aspect of the time aspect of it is not necessarily controlling.

There's got to be a connection with the provision of the medical service not something related to a medical service because that way everything a doctor did would be open to question. For example, Dr. Mahan selling his house and committing a fraud there, you know, overcharging somebody or hiding a defect on a house or something of that nature. You agree, do you not, that Dr. Mahan selling his house and

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1
    committing a fraud the Secretary can't be
2
    excluded --
3
              MR. WENTHE: Because there's no medical
4
    service anywhere in that scenario, your Honor.
5
              THE COURT:
                           That's right. He's a
6
    doctor, but there's no medical service there.
7
              MR. WENTHE: Now, the very question we
8
    are discussing right now is one that the Court is
9
    foreclosed from getting into. The Court cannot
10
    substitute its judgment for that of the agency on
    this question. This is a question of statutory
11
12
    interpretation, and your Honor wants to construe
13
    "in connection with" to mean very closely related
14
    in time.
15
              THE COURT: No, no, that's not
16
    necessarily true, Mr. Wenthe.
              MR. WENTHE: That's just what you said
17
18
    to me, your Honor, and the agency has said --
19
              THE COURT: Well, wait, wait, wait,
20
    don't mischaracterize what I'm saying or doing.
21
    I didn't say that it had to be very closely
22
    related in time, did I?
23
              MR. WENTHE: Yes, you did, but go ahead
24
    and tell me what -- what you --
25
              THE COURT: No, I did not. I most
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certainly did not and don't mischaracterize what
1
2
    I say.
3
              MR. WENTHE: Tell me what you think the
4
    statute means, your Honor.
5
              THE COURT: Well, I've told you that
6
    already, Mr. Wenthe, and I'm not going to have
7
    you mischaracterize what I said. We said that it
8
    could be three months later, didn't I? Were you
9
    listening? Don't smirk at me. Don't smirk at
10
    me, Mr. Wenthe.
11
              MR. WENTHE: I'm smiling at you, your
12
    Honor.
13
              THE COURT: What? What? Don't smirk
14
    at me. You're going to be in trouble, sir.
15
    We're in recess.
16
                    (Recess taken from
17
                10:20 a.m. to 10:25 a.m.)
18
              THE COURT: We are back in session.
19
    Thank you. You may be seated.
2.0
                     All right, resume your argument,
    Mr. Wenthe.
21
22
              MR. WENTHE: I apologize to the Court.
23
    I meant no disrespect.
24
              THE COURT: Well, it certainly appeared
25
    disrespectful. Contentious, that's the way it
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1
    appeared, Mr. Wenthe. Smirk away all you want.
2
    Now go ahead and let me hear the rest of your
3
    argument and smirk all you want.
4
              MR. WENTHE: I mean no disrespect to
5
    the Court.
6
              THE COURT: Yes, you do. You most
7
    certainly do. You were smirking at me.
8
    mischaracterized what I said. That's fine.
9
    Continue your argument.
10
              MR. WENTHE: The agency has construed
11
    the words "in connection with" over the course of
12
    many years and they have applied that
13
    construction over and over and over, and they are
14
    permitted by Congress and by case law to do so.
15
    Their construction of those words "in connection
16
    with" means a common sense connection.
17
    found in this case that the health care service
18
    provided by Dr. Kabins which was a service
19
    performed on Melodie Simon for which he admitted
2.0
    in his plea agreement that he could be held to
21
    have committed malpractice by a viable lawsuit by
22
    her. He admitted that.
23
              THE COURT: Well, he disagrees.
24
    disagrees with what you're saying, but that's
    fine. Go ahead. It's your argument.
25
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MR. WENTHE: It is my argument, and it
    is his admission and your Honor will find his
    admissions in his plea agreement which begins at
    page 777 of the record and in particular the
    facts admitted under oath by him which begin at
    784 of the record and in Subparagraph (d) of
    those facts appears this statement: Accordingly,
    Dr. Kabins believed that Ms. Simon could bring a
    viable lawsuit against him arising out of
    provision of a health care item or service to
    her. And he escaped being sued for malpractice
    by covering up the fraud committed by Howard
13
    Awand and Noel Gage to which he also pled that he
    acknowledged that those men had committed the
15
    crime of fraud and that he concealed it.
                     So there is in the agency's view
17
    a common sense connection between his provision
    of that health care service for which he could
19
    have been sued for malpractice and his
20
    concealment and his conviction for concealment of
21
    the fact of fraud that got him out of being sued
    for malpractice for that health care item for
23
    service.
24
                     The agency decided in its --
25
    both its administrative law judge decided and its
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DAB, Department Appeals Board, that construing its statute as it had for many, many years "in connection with" was satisfied in this case. The Court wishes to adopt a different interpretation of the words "in connection with" than what the agency has adopted. The Court is not permitted to do so by the doctrine of Chevron deference.
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When the agency has an ambiguous statute to apply, the agency is afforded the discretion to choose within that range of reasonable constructions of that statute which one it will apply and it has done so. The Court apparently is saying that the construction by the agency here is completely outside that reasonable range of reasonable interpretations of the words "in connection with."

That seems highly unlikely since we have cited to you the Supreme Court's case of Morales in which the Supreme Court construed the words "in connection with" and relating to the statute and gave them the exact same meaning that the agency gives them and has given those words for many years. And so if the Court disagrees with the Supreme Court's Morales decision and wishes to overrule it --

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1
              THE COURT: Okay, cut it again, cut the
2
    crap, cut the contentious attitude, all right?
3
    I'm not going to overrule the Supreme Court. Do
4
    you really think I'm going to overrule the
5
    Supreme Court, Mr. Wenthe? I can't hear you.
6
              MR. WENTHE: Of course not, of course
7
    not, of course not.
8
                          What are you arguing --
              THE COURT:
9
    nothing -- your whole attitude today has been
10
    nothing but contentious.
11
              MR. WENTHE: That's incorrect, your
12
    Honor.
13
              THE COURT: No, that's not incorrect,
14
          Nothing but contentious. You mean I'm
15
    going to overrule the Supreme Court. Don't be
16
    stupid.
              MR. WENTHE: And that's the point.
17
18
              THE COURT: Try to make an argument
19
    that's coherent and not -- you sound like a
20
    little kid on the playground. I've indicated I
21
    might not rule in your favor and so you give a
22
    boo-hoo-hoo and try to -- yeah, go ahead and
23
    smirk some more. That's funny. Go ahead, go
24
    ahead, let me hear some more of your argument.
25
              MR. WENTHE: I think that I've stated
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1
    it as clearly as I can. The agency --
2
              THE COURT: But you say your contempt
3
    very clearly. That's what you did. Go ahead.
4
              MR. WENTHE: The agency has decided
5
    what these words mean.
6
              THE COURT: So I can't question the
7
    agency. I have to just bow down to the agency
8
    and rubber stamp it. That's Mr. Wenthe's
9
    position. Anything else? That's what you just
10
    told me. I'm bound by that. I can't question
11
    that at all. Now what's your next argument?
12
              MR. WENTHE: I think, your Honor, that
13
    if anyone reads the record here, they will never
14
    see the words bow down coming out of my mouth.
15
    They came only out of yours. Now, the other
16
    point that has to be dealt with here that
17
    apparently has already -- well, it was not
18
    addressed by anybody yet today -- and that's
19
    relating to, this conviction has to be relating
2.0
    to fraud. I don't see how that could be
21
    questioned here. The conviction was for
22
    concealment of a fraud.
23
                     So the only argument really that
24
    Dr. Kabins has to oppose that is to say that we
25
    have to read the statute so that fraud only
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involves financial misconduct fraud and,
1
2
    therefore, because this is not a financial
3
    misconduct case, this is not a conviction
4
    relating to fraud. I don't see that. I think
5
    that -- and particularly not when we have the
6
    Friedman versus Sebelius case which was just
7
    decided by the DC Circuit Court of Appeals this
8
    year, and we offered that to you in our
9
    supplemental authorities.
10
                      It went through a very lengthy
11
    discussion of the purpose, history, and text of
12
    the statute and said, no, Congress did not mean
13
    to restrict this statute to just financial
14
    misconduct fraud. It's any kind of fraud.
                                                 And
15
    so it would be improper to read the statute that
16
    way as Dr. Kabins wants to and so we think that
17
    part of it is satisfied. And really that's the
18
    only two issues that there are here having the in
19
    connection with health care item or service and
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Those were the two contested issues before the agency, and they are the only two issues here and for the reasons we've stated we feel they are both satisfied very amply here when the statute is read in accordance with

had to be relating to fraud.

2.0

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1
    Chevron deference which applies to agency
2
    interpretations of their own statutes when they
3
    are ambiguous. So if the Court has no other
4
    questions, that's all I have.
5
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
6
                      Ma'am, did you have anything or
7
    any argument you wanted to make?
8
              MR. WENTHE: Are you asking counsel?
9
              MS. WRIGHT: No, sir, I don't.
10
              THE COURT: No?
11
                      All right, I'll give you a
12
    chance to reply.
13
              MR. CHESNOFF: Just briefly, your
14
            In review of our pleadings, we were able
    Honor.
15
    to distinguish the argument that they made about
16
    Morales. Morales doesn't apply. As far as
    Chevron goes, your Honor, the Supreme Court has
17
18
    said you are allowed to decide whether it's
19
    reasonable, and that's what I believe the Court
2.0
    was attempting to do.
21
                      I would also point out as the
22
    Court did when the Secretary stands up and says
23
    that they've been applying this uniformly
24
    regularly, one only has to look at the list of
25
    doctors who we put in our pleadings who actually
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were engaged in conduct involving medical services. Dr. Kabins has performed this surgery long before and that's why the temporal argument is so important, and he would have performed the surgery regardless of any scheme -- excuse me, I'm a little excited myself actually -- any scheme that Gage and the other gentleman engaged in. He did the surgery.
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It had nothing to do with their scheme to commit item or service fraud which is not a medical fraud and the statute also talks about, and especially the Ninth Circuit, your Honor, in the context of the fraud having a financial component. So for all the reasons that we've stated in our brief and the arguments today and the fact that the Secretary has relied on law that's not appropriate, including the supplements they filed, the Fourth Circuit case and the DC Circuit case, those cases involve people who actually engaged in the actual fraud themselves.

And we're aware one of the elements that the Court has been focusing on was consciously met by the people involved. In our case if you analyze the elements the Court correctly stated that one and two exist, three is

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questionable. And, of course, we've argued it
1
2
    doesn't apply or hasn't been met, but most
3
    importantly element number four has never been
4
    established as a basis for the really draconian
5
    and isolated punishment that Dr. Kabins has
6
    suffered totally inconsistent with the
7
    Secretary's decisions in other doctors' cases.
8
                      Thank you.
9
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
10
                      As I said at the beginning, it's
11
    a close case. Did you want to add something, Mr.
12
    Wenthe? Go ahead.
13
              MR. WENTHE: You know, I didn't get a
14
    chance to talk about the other doctors. Would
15
    your Honor permit me?
16
              THE COURT: Of course.
17
              MR. WENTHE: Because your Honor did
18
    raise that in your opening remarks and I wanted
19
    to --
2.0
              MR. CHESNOFF: Actually the Secretary's
21
    lawyer raised it by saying that they do this
22
    fairly in all cases.
23
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
24
              MR. WENTHE: Fair enough, but this
25
    whole question of other doctors who are getting
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excluded, I do want to address that. We did
1
2
    address that in our briefs obviously, but I think
3
    your Honor is looking at that as though there's
4
    some unfairness going on. The statute is
5
    mandatory. The statute is mandatory.
                                            When we
6
    find a doctor, and the doctor comes to our
7
    attention and a hearing is held and all these
8
    statutory elements are satisfied, that doctor
9
    must be excluded. The agency has no discretion
10
    not to exclude him.
11
                      Now, the fact that other people
12
    may be out there who haven't been caught yet, we
13
    don't have an explanation for that.
                                          The record
14
    does not give us an explanation because the
15
    agency excluded all of that evidence as being
16
    irrelevant. If your Honor feels that that issue
17
    needs some more exploration by the agency that
18
    they should take that into account that that is
19
    relevant to their decision, then the thing to do
2.0
    is to remand this to the agency for further
21
    factual findings because they didn't make any
22
    findings of fact on this.
23
                      They excluded it all as being
24
    irrelevant, and I think they were right to
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exclude it as irrelevant, but if you disagree

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1
    with that and feel that they should consider it,
2
    it really is a matter for the agency to consider
3
    on remand. So I just wanted to make that one --
4
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
5
                      As I said at the outset, this is
6
    to me a close question. It's a very close
7
    question, but I think on balance the plaintiff is
8
    entitled to summary judgment. So, if you would,
9
    Mr. Chesnoff, prepare an appropriate order.
10
              MR. CHESNOFF: Yes, sir, your Honor.
11
              THE COURT: Do it forthwith and let's
12
    file it, and then you all can appeal my decision.
13
              MR. CHESNOFF: I know I won't be
14
    filing, your Honor.
15
              THE COURT: Well, I know the government
16
    will be, so that's fine. That's why God created
17
    San Francisco.
18
              MR. CHESNOFF: Have a nice afternoon,
19
    your Honor.
20
              THE COURT: Yes, sir. Thank you. You,
21
    too.
22
23
          (Whereupon, the proceedings concluded.)
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                        I hereby certify that pursuant
    to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the
2
    foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the
    stenographically reported proceedings held in the
3
    above-entitled matter.
4
                                      /s/ Joy Garner
JOY GARNER, CCR 275
5
    Date: August 26, 2012
6
                                      U.S. Court Reporter
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                       -JOY GARNER, CCR 275 -
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